Michael Devitt presents a series of essays with four recurring themes: (i) a sharp distinction between metaphysical issues and semantic ones; (ii) the priority of metaphysical issues over epistemological and semantic issues; (iii) a naturalistic opposition to the a priori taken largely from Quine; (iv) an uncompromising 'realism about the external world'. Topics include Plato's 'one over many' problem; nonfactualism; truth; moral realism; biological realism; biological essentialism; intuitions and their proper role. INDICE: METAPHYSICS; 1: 'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?; Postscript to ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?'; 2: Aberrations of the Realism Debate; Postscript to 'Aberrations of the Realism Debate'; 3: Underdetermination and Commonsense Realism; 4: Scientific Realism; Postscript to 'Scientific Realism'; 5: Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics; Postscript to 'Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics'; 6: Global Response Dependency and Worldmaking; 7: The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism; 8: The Metaphysics of Truth; 9: Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective; 10: Natural Kinds and Biological Realisms; 11: Resurrecting Biological Essentialism; EPISTEMOLOGY; 12: Naturalism and the A Priori; 13: No Place for the A Priori; 14: Intuitions; 15: On Determining What There Isn't
- ISBN: 978-0-19-957697-5
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 368
- Fecha Publicación: 07/01/2010
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés