Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. One of the few efforts to bridge analytic-philosophical and phenomenological dicussions on first-person reference A distinctive theory of the uniqueness of persons and the ontology of the self A unique discussion of the “afterlife within a transcendental phenomenological framework Integration of a theory of love into central themes of the phenomenological ontology of theself INDICE: 1. Phenomenological Preliminaries. 2. The First-Person and the Transcendental I. 3. Ipseity’s Ownness and Uniqueness. 4. Love as the Fulfillmentof the Second-Person Perspective. 4.1. The Second-Person Perspective. 4.2. Love, Person, and Ipseity. 5.The Ontology and Meontology of I-ness. 6. The Paradoxes of the Transcendental Person. 7. The Death of the Transcendental Person. 8. The Afterlife, the Person and the Transcendental I.
- ISBN: 978-1-4020-8797-4
- Editorial: Springer
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 570
- Fecha Publicación: 01/05/2009
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés