Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience? Although perceptual experiences frequently give rise to beliefs, the content of these beliefs do not always simply reflect the contents of the experiences on which they are based. Instead, they often rest on background knowledge and beliefs, as well as experience. This raises the question of how are we able to determine what the admissible contents of experience are, whether they include singular or existential contents, and whether they include contents pertaining to causation or natural kinds. The papers in this collection address these issues,together with questions concerning the nature of perceptual content. They deal with the central issues of whether perceptual content is similar to the content of the propositional attitudes; whether all states with content fall neatly into the categories of either belief or experience. The book also focuses onwhether there exists a continuum from states that are more like perceptual experiences to states that are more like belief, and, indeed, ultimately whetherwe should consider perceptual experiences to have content at all. This ground-breaking volume is published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly.
- ISBN: 978-1-4443-3335-0
- Editorial: Wiley-Blackwell
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 192
- Fecha Publicación: 06/08/2010
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés