Handbook on approval voting

Handbook on approval voting

Laslier, Jean-François
Sanver, M. Remzi

114,35 €(IVA inc.)

Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve' as many candidates as they want,and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburnin 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved." Surveys all major developments in Approval Voting since the publication of the seminal book by Brams/Fishburn (1983) Combination of theoretical and empirical results Written by specialists of the various disciplines involved INDICE: History of Approval Voting.- Axiomatic Theory.- Committees.- Strategic Voting.- Probabilistic Exercises.- Experiments.- Electoral Competition.- Meaning for Individual and Society.

  • ISBN: 978-3-642-02838-0
  • Editorial: Springer
  • Encuadernacion: Cartoné
  • Páginas: 480
  • Fecha Publicación: 01/07/2010
  • Nº Volúmenes: 1
  • Idioma: Inglés