Error and inference: recent exchanges on experimental reasoning, reliability, and the objectivity and rationality of science

Although both philosophers and scientists are interested in how to obtain reliable knowledge in the face of error, there is a gap between their perspectives that has been an obstacle to progress. By means of a series of exchanges between the editors and leaders from philosophy of science, statistics, and economics, this volume offers a cumulative introduction connecting problems of traditional philosophy of science to problems of inference in statistical and empirical modelling practice. Philosophers of science and scientific practitionersare challenged to reevaluate the assumptions of their own theories - philosophical or methodological. Practitioners may better appreciate the foundational issues around which their questions revolve and thereby become better 'appliedphilosophers'. Conversely, new avenues emerge for finally solving recalcitrant philosophical problems of induction, explanation, and theory testing. INDICE: 1. Introduction and background: 1-I. Philosophy of methodological practice Deborah Mayo, 1-II. Error statistical philosophy Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos; 2. Severe testing, error statistics, and the growth of theoretical knowledge Deborah Mayo; 3-I. Can scientific theories be warranted? Alan Chalmers; 3-II. Can scientific theories be warranted with severity? Exchanges with Alan Chalmers Deborah Mayo; 4-I. Critical rationalism, explanation and severe tests Alan Musgrave; 4-II. Towards progressive critical rationalism: exchanges with Alan Musgrave Deborah Mayo; 5-I. Error, tests and theory-confirmation JohnWorrall; 5-II. Has Worrall saved his theory (on ad hoc saves) in a non ad hocmanner? Exchanges with Worrall Deborah Mayo; 6-I. Mill's sins, or Mayo's errors? Peter Achinstein; 6-II. Sins of the Bayesian epistemologist: exchanges with Achinstein Deborah Mayo; 7. Theory testing in economics and the error statistical perspective Aris Spanos; 8-I. Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference Deborah Mayo and David Cox; 8-II. Objectivity and conditionality in Frequentist inference David Cox and Deborah Mayo; 8-III. An error in theargument from WCP and S to the SLP Deborah Mayo; 8-IV. On a new philosophy ofFrequentist inference: exchanges with Cox and Mayo Aris Spanos; 9-I. Explanation and truth Clark Glymour; 9-II. Explanation and testing: exchanges with Glymour Deborah Mayo; 9-III. Graphical causal modeling and error statistics: exchanges with Glymour Aris Spanos; 10-I. Legal epistemology: the anomaly of affirmative defenses Larry Laudan; 10-II. Error and the law: exchanges with Laudan Deborah Mayo.

• ISBN: 978-0-521-88008-4
• Editorial: Cambridge University
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 438
• Fecha Publicación: 07/01/2010
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés