This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of the argument is to suggest that the theory of rational choice is less deterministic than many suppose. INDICE: 1. Introduction and sketch of the main argument; 2. The ordering principle; 3. The independence principle; 4. The problem of justification; 5. Pragmatic arguments; 6. Dynamic choice problems; 7. Rationality conditions on dynamic choice; 8. Consequentialist constructions; 9. Rethinking the problem ofdynamic consistency; 10. A critique of the pragmatic arguments; 11. Formalizing the pragmatic arguments; 12. The feasibility of resolute choice; 13. Connections; 14. Conclusions; Postscript: projections.
- ISBN: 978-0-521-06391-3
- Editorial: Cambridge University
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 328
- Fecha Publicación: 05/06/2008
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés