This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reasonis fundamental to all thought. INDICE: Preface; Synopsis; I: Introduction; Part One The Structure of Normative Concepts; II: Reasons; III: Indexicality, Universalisability and the Range of Reasons; IV: Normativity; V: Warrant; Part Two Epistemic Reasons; VI:The A Priori; VII: Analyticity; VIII: Modality; IX: Non-monotonic Norms; PartThree Evaluative and Practical Reasons; X: Rational Explanation: Belief, Feeling and Will; XI: Reasons and Feelings: (i) The Bridge Principle and the Concept of a Person's Good; XII: Reasons and Feelings: (ii) Moral Concepts; XIII: Impartiality (i) The Principle of Good; XIV: Impartiality (ii) The Demand Principle; XV: Moral Judgement and Feeling; Part Four The Normative View; XVI: The Epistemology of Reason Relations; XVII: The Ontology of Reason Relations; XVIII: Rules, Norms and Concepts; XIX: Self and Self-Determination; XX: The Critique of Reasons; Appendix: Symbols, Terms and Theses; References; Index
- ISBN: 978-0-19-958763-6
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 560
- Fecha Publicación: 25/11/2010
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés