Subgame consistent economic optimization: an advanced cooperative dynamic game analysis

Various imperfections in existing market systems prevent the free market fromserving as a truly efficient allocation mechanism, but optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure. Cooperative optimizationclaims that socially optimal and individually rational solutions to decision problems involving strategic action over time exist. To ensure that cooperation will last throughout the agreement period, however, the stringent condition of subgame consistency is required. This textbook presents a study of subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle the suboptimal behavior that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve. The first title on the topic of subgame consistent economic optimization. Illustrates the potential of cooperative dynamic games to help formulate new policy on previously unsolvable market problems. Valuable as both a research reference and as a textbook, with exercises included throughout the book. Suitable for an interdisciplinary audience of game theorists, economists, mathematicians, policy makers, and corporate planners. INDICE: Preface. Introduction.- 1 Dynamic Strategic Interactions in Economic System.- 2 Dynamic Economic Optimization: Group Optimality and Individual Rationality. 3 Time Consistency and Optimal-Trajectory-Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization. 4 Dynamically Stable Cost-saving Joint Venture. 5 Collaborative Environmental Management. 6 Dynamically Stable Dormant Firm Cartel. 7 Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization Under Uncertainty. 8 Cost-saving Joint Venture Under Uncertainty. 9 Collaborative Environmental Management Under Uncertainty. 10 Subgame Consistent Dormant Firm Cartel. 11 Dynamic Consistency in Discrete-time Cooperative Games. 12 Discrete-time Cooperative Games Under Uncertainty. Technical Appendices. References. Index.

• ISBN: 978-0-8176-8261-3
• Editorial: Birkhäuser Boston
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 370
• Fecha Publicación: 28/12/2011
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés